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Abstract 
Was the European Marriage Pattern an important contributor to England’s precocious eco-
nomic development? We examine this question by embedding the possibility in a historically 
substantiated demographic-economic model, supported by both cross-section and long time 
series evidence. Persistent high mortality and powerful mortality shocks in the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries lowered life expectations. Subsequently increased life expectancy reduced 
the number of births necessary to achieve a given family size. Fewer births were achieved by 
a higher age at first marriage of females. Later marriage not only constrained population growth 
but also provided greater opportunities for female informal learning, especially through ‘ser-
vice’. In a period when the family was the principal institution for socialising future workers, 
such learning was a significant contributor to the intergenerational transmission and accumu-
lation of human capital. Our paper shows how, over the centuries, the gradual induced rise of 
human capital raised productivity and eventually brought about the Industrial Revolution. 
Without the contribution of late marriage to human capital accumulation broadly interpreted, 
real wages in England would not have risen strongly in the early nineteenth century and would 
have been about half the level actually achieved. 
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Hajnal2 identified a distinctive European marriage pattern: the late age at first marriage of fe-
males in western Europe by 1500, and the high proportion of females remaining celibate. This 
‘low pressure’ European demographic regime was later linked to precocious European eco-
nomic growth.3 The linkage has been questioned recently by Denison and Ogilvie4 with an 
analysis of the 2,622 observations of female age at first marriage for 39 European societies 
over the four centuries before 1900. They show that European countries with the most extreme 
forms of the marriage pattern did not become the most economically advanced in these years. 
They go on to draw attention to many other likely causal influences on European economic 
growth, as well as to the endogeneity of the marriage pattern. This paper demonstrates that 
these linkages can, to some extent, be quantified in a model of English economic development 
allowing an important role for the marriage pattern.  
Explanations in history or social science can rarely be based plausibly on a single ‘cause’ or 
‘reason’. It is unlikely that any single institution or event was responsible for a transformation 
of society—such as the English Industrial Revolution—especially when so many have previ-
ously been accorded this honour. Rather, there must have been an interaction of a considerable 
number of elements. The approach here is therefore to embed the idea to be tested in a model, 
a simplification of reality, that conforms with the salient evidence. The central hypothesis is 
that the late age of female first marriage was a major contributor to England’s Industrial Rev-
olution because of the contribution to human capital accumulation. We adopt the OECD5 broad 
definition of human capital; advances in useful knowledge, from schooling, from successful 
technological innovations, from parenting and from many other sources. The test of the hy-
pothesis is whether, without this nuptiality pattern, the Industrial Revolution, here defined as 
an eventual strong and sustained rise in real wages, would have occurred when it did. 
The timing of the increase in real wages has been controversial. Some ‘pessimists’ defer it until 
as late as the 1850s whereas optimists identify a rise much earlier6. Ashton famously remarked 
that the great achievemen’Eurt of the Industrial Revolution was to absorb the massive increase 
in population without a fall in wages7. For this reason the modelling of the relation between 
                                                 
2 Hajnal, ‘European marriage patterns in perspective’. 
3 Greif, ‘Family structure, institutions, and growth’; Greif and Tabellini, ‘Cultural and institutional bifurcation’; 
De Moor and Van Zanden, ‘Girl power’; Foreman-Peck, ‘The western European marriage pattern and economic 
development’; Voigtländer and Voth, ‘How the west “invented” fertility restriction’. Carmichael et al, ‘European 
marriage pattern measurement’.  
4
 Denison and Ogilvie, ‘Does the European marriage pattern explain growth?’, ‘Institutions, demography,and 
economic growth’. 
5 OECD, ‘Wellbeing of nations’. 
6 Feinstein, ‘Pessimism perpetuated’; Lindert and Williamson, ‘English workers' living standards during the in-
dustrial revolution’. 
7 Ashton, The industrial revolution, p161. 
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population and economy is critical. Malthus and others point to deferred marriage as a con-
straint on population growth8. But this contribution must have been more complex, for popu-
lation growth in England was faster than elsewhere. Between 1600 and 1820, India’s popula-
tions is estimated to have risen 55 per cent, China’s grew by nearly 140 per cent9 while Eng-
land’s expanded by almost 180 per cent.10  
We provide some new historical evidence that later female marriage age was associated with 
greater female human capital, as measured by literacy. This is a connection not made by Mal-
thus and one that may be expected to have encouraged the transmission of more human capital 
to  children. Baten et al have found a such a significant numeracy effect in Eastern Europe in 
the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries11. Acquisition of literacy and numeracy were just two 
elements of human capital accumulation where parenting mattered. As many innovators of the 
Industrial Revolution show, general cultural orientation could be as important.  
We go on to demonstrate that an identified structural model, consistent with the long but un-
balanced or fragmentary demographic and economic time series available for England, is ca-
pable of explaining the eventual real wage increase of the Industrial Revolution. The proposed 
economic growth process is triggered by the high mortality of the fourteenth century and the 
subsequent re-balancing of power that broke the feudal system. Gradual accumulation of hu-
man capital, broadly defined, ultimately launches a strong growth in real wages after a long 
struggle to offset the consequences of a rising population. A merit of our approach is that it can 
support counterfactuals implied by our central hypothesis; not only can we show what would 
have happened without the high marriage age but we can also demonstrate how England’s 
economic history might have resembled those of other economies if specific conditions had 
been different. Also, estimation of the model by the simulated method of moments allows a 
closer connection between theory and data than simple calibration.12  
First we substantiate the critical elements of the model and discuss the available time series 
data. The following three sections look at the historical evidence respectively for population, 
mortality and marriage age, for real wages, labour supply and GDP, and for human capital and 
the link with female marriage age. Section IV employs international cross-section data at the 
end of the European Marriage Pattern period to demonstrate a link between late female mar-
riage age and human capital, measured by literacy. The following section outlines the model 
that utilises the English time series and its essential features. Then we show how well English 
                                                 
8 Ashraf and Galor, ‘Dynamics and stagnation in the malthusian epoch’. 
9 Maddison, ‘Statistics on world population, GDP and per capita GDP’. 
10 Wrigley and Schofield, The population history of England, Table A3.3. 
11 Baten et al, ‘“Girl power” in Eastern Europe?’ 
12 Boucekkine et al, ‘Early literacy achievements, population and the transition to modern growth’; Cervellati 
and Sunde, ‘Human capital formation, life expectancy, and the process of development’. Our complete model is 
in an Appendix and the estimation details are available from the authors in a separate paper. 
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economic growth can be explained by the model, primarily by simulation. We demonstrate that 
removing the marriage age effect prevents or defers the eventual real wage growth of the Eng-
lish Industrial Revolution. We then place the English experience in a wider context by consid-
ering counterfactuals that might explain the different growth outcomes in other historical econ-
omies.  
I. Mortality and the Demography 
A vital characteristic of English economic history is the population collapse in the fourteenth 
century (Figure 1). Whether precipitated by a Malthusian crisis of over-population13 or simply 
a response to an exogenous series of famines and plagues of extraordinary intensity and fre-
quency,14 the evidence of demographic decline is clear. In counties at opposite ends of England, 
Durham and Essex, village-level data shows population falling by more than one half.15 Clark’s 
calculations16 from wage data reach a broadly comparable conclusion for aggregate English 
population. Broadberry et al17 estimate population in 1290 only 60,000 below the 1348 peak 
of 4.81 million. Thereafter their benchmarks show population falling to a low of 1.9 million in 
1450.18 English parish registration generally began in 1541. From these series Wrigley and 
Schofield estimate total English population, which we link to Broadberry et al’s medieval data 
in Figure 1.19  
Driving the decline in population we postulate is a ‘high mortality regime’ that we distinguish 
from ‘temporary mortality shocks’. The Great European famine of 1315-17 and the animal 
epidemics suggest a beginning of this regime. From a measure of the mortality of creditors, 
Nightingale concludes that the high mortality regime lasted until at least the middle of the 
fifteenth century.20 Wage data that peaks around the middle of the fifteenth century indicates 
that population decline in the face of the high mortality terminated somewhat earlier (to allow 
time for increased numbers of new labour force entrants to influence the labour market); in the 
absence of major changes in birth rates, the high mortality regime then ended about 1420. 
Cummins’ finding21 of a structural break in European noble lifespans around 1400, when lon-
gevity increased from about 50 to 55, is broadly consistent with this characterisation, bearing 
                                                 
13 Postan and Titow, ‘Heriots and prices on winchester manors’. 
14 Hatcher and Bailey, Modeling the Middle Ages, pp. 55-65. 
15 Dodds, ‘Estimating arable output’; Poos, ‘The rural population of essex in the later Middle Ages’. 
16 Clark, ‘The long march of history’. 
17 Broadberry et al, British economic growth. 
18 Broadberry et al annual index numbers are in Appendix 5.3 of their book. We adopt the Broadberry data be-
cause of the benchmarks derived from samples of manorial populations. Clark, ‘The long march of history’, esti-
mates a peak population of six million but Russell, ‘British medieval population’, p. 280, concluded the figure 
was just under four million. 
19 Lee (‘Inverse projection and back projection: Comparative results and sensitivity tests for England’; ‘Inverse 
projection and demographic fluctuations: A critical assessment of new methods’) agrees that the estimates are a 
fair representation of population. 
20 Nightingale, ‘Some new evidence of crises and trends of mortality in late medieval England’. 
21 Cummins, ‘Longevity and the rise of the west’. 
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in mind that noble life styles and environments differed substantially from the majority of the 
population22.  
Figure 1 Population and Wage (15-Year Average Index) 
 
Notes: The wage series is computed based on male earnings23 and female wage24. Population is based on Broad-
berry et al25 and Wrigley and Schofield26. The original data are either annual or decadal, and the 15-year average 
here is to be in line with the model period. 
High mortality rates are apparent from three longitudinal studies of late medieval monasteries 
beginning in 1395.27 1430 seems to be a low in the crude death rates of these studies, consistent 
with our ending of the high mortality regime. Hatcher et al emphasise high levels of monastic 
mortality towards the end of the fifteenth and into the early sixteenth century. We identify this 
later fifteenth century mortality rise as a shock or a series of shocks rather than a regime shift.28 
The fourteenth century demographic catastrophe precipitated fundamental institutional change. 
Ensuing labour scarcity undermined the unfree relations of serfdom and permitted less re-
stricted household choices.29 One of these, we contend, was the later age of female first mar-
riage.30 Family reconstitutions for five Lincolnshire manors between 1272 and 1478 indicate 
                                                 
22 De La Croix and Licandro’s ‘famous people’ data are insufficiently accurate over this period to use as mortal-
ity change evidence.  
23 Clark, 'Average earnings and retail prices, UK, 1209-2010'. 
24 Humphries and Weisdorf, 'The wages of women in England 1260-1850'. 
25 Broadberry et al, British economic growth, 1270-1870. 
26 Wrigley and Schofield, The population history of England, 1541-1871: A reconstruction. 
27 Hatcher, ‘Mortality in the fifteenth century’; Bailey, ‘Demographic decline in late Medieval England’; 
Hatcher et al, ‘Monastic mortality’. 
28 Jonker, ‘Life expectancy’ considers inquisition post mortems for fourteenth century taking into account trun-
cation and censoring of the data and concludes that the Black Death did not reduce life expectancy very much. 
We are obliged to infer then that the rich tenants in chief were different from the poor. Otherwise Jonkers’ sug-
gestions that fifteenth and fourteenth century mortalities were similar cannot be squared with wage and popula-
tion movements over these two centuries. 
29 Bailey, The decline of serfdom in late Medieval England. 
30 Hajnal, ‘European marriage patterns in perspective’; De Moor and Zanden, ‘Girl power’. 
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that before the Black Death in 1348 the mean age at first marriage for women was 21.4.31 
Afterwards this age rose to 24.6.32 Marriage age was not always clear because medieval mar-
riage in England simply required the consent of both parties and a witness. Solemnisation by 
the Church could come later. Hence there can be considerable uncertainty about actual mar-
riage age.33 
The new marriage pattern has been interpreted as a response to improved female employment 
prospects.34 Greater labour scarcity and higher living standards induced a shift away from grain 
production towards animal husbandry, in which supposedly there was a female comparative 
advantage. However, women’s wages in England do not seem to have conformed to this pat-
tern.35 Improved employment prospects should have raised female wages as they did wages for 
males, yet (unmarried) women’s annual contract wages did not increase.36 Kussmaul suggests 
almost the opposite pattern; the sharp drop in population caused by plague encouraged enforce-
ment of labour service.37 This was facilitated by keeping young women under the employer’s 
roof, and this in turn required deferred marriage until the end of service.  
Deferred female marriage was consistent with individuals’ objectives because mortality fell 
while there was greater labour scarcity in the later fifteenth century. Marriage age rose because 
eventually lower mortality required fewer births to achieve a given surviving number of chil-
dren. This explanation is compatible with Kussmaul’s interpretation and with Humphries and 
Weisdorf’s findings. The rise in marriage age was a rational household response to the ending 
of a high mortality regime. Service and delayed marriage age were a means of achieving a 
target family size. When the mortality regime shifted in the fifteenth century, if marriage age 
rose the supply of unmarried female workers will have increased relative to that of married 
females. Such an increase in the marriage age may have been sufficient to prevent a fall in the 
supply of this type of labour. By contrast for daily female workers, labour supply would have 
declined by at least as much as for male daily wage earners and so their wages would have 
risen correspondingly.  
If a small number of births was required (because of relatively low mortality), marriage would 
be delayed and there would be time for saving to establish separate household. Neolocality, 
                                                 
31 Hallam, ‘Age at first marriage and age at death in the Lincolnshire Fenland 1252-1478’. 
32 The 1377 poll tax returns at first sight indicate an early age at marriage (a pre-European marriage pattern), but 
this interpretation can be undermined by plausible selective under-registration. 
33
 This is shown by the Bishop of Norwich’s interrogation of Margery Paston in 1469; ‘he would understand the 
words that she had said to him (her man), whether it made matrimony or not’. ‘(Margery) said she thought in her 
conscience she was bound, whatsoever the words wern.’ ‘her words and his (her man) accorded’ (Davis, Paston 
Letters). 
34 Voigtländer and Voth, ‘How the west “invented” fertility restriction’; De Moor and Van Zanden, ‘Girl power’. 
35 Humphries and Weisdorf, ‘ Wages of women in England 1260-1850’. 
36 Casual or daily wages for women (usually married) did rise but the divergence between the two types of 
wages was not observed for males (J. Thorold Rogers, Six centuries of work and wages, ch. 12 ). 
37 Kussmaul, Servants in husbandry in early modern England, p. 168. 
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that facet of the marriage pattern whereby a newly married couple lived separately from both 
the husband’s and the wife’s natal household, is a likely consequence of these choices. 
Later changes in the average female age at first marriage are doubtful from the available evi-
dence. Weir and Schofield concluded that celibacy movements dominated in explaining gross 
reproduction rate before 1700 or 1741,38 but afterwards the age at marriage mattered more39. 
In the eighteenth century according to one estimate there was a rise in fertility because marriage 
age fell, with little change in the proportion never married.40 Dennison and Ogilvie find the 
opposite trend in marriage age—a rise—in their broad European sample from the sixteenth to 
the nineteenth centuries.41 Nonetheless, the Schofield data probably represents the current con-
sensus for England for marriage age and celibacy42.  
II. Wage and the Economy 
An essential indicator of the long run growth of wellbeing is the average real wage, even though 
at the beginning of the period the majority of workers were not wage earners. Many lived di-
rectly off the produce of the land they worked, sometimes in exchange for labour services on a 
manorial demesne. Employment and remuneration changed over the centuries. While attempts 
were made to hold back market forces,43 Clark provides evidence that medieval efforts were 
unsuccessful where male wages are concerned, other than in the very short run.44 Hence it is 
reasonable to assume that the marginal productivity of wage labour was closely related to mar-
ginal productivity in self-employment and across trades.  
Clark’s series45 shows that earnings were apparently higher in 1450 than in 1800, an outcome 
conventionally attributed to labour scarcity (and land fixity) at the earlier date. Allen’s real 
wage measure show broadly the same pattern, but is focussed on specific large towns across 
Europe46. The Clark data is based upon separate indices of male farm day wages, male coal 
mining day wages, and male building wages (to represent both the secondary and tertiary sec-
tors). These are aggregated into a national male wage using estimates of the share of males 
employed in each sector.  
                                                 
38 Weir, ‘Rather never than late’; Schofield, ‘English marriage patterns revisited’. 
39 Unregistered and clandestine marriage may have been a significant proportion of the total (Schofield, ‘English 
marriage patterns revisited’). 
40 Wrigley et al, English population history from family reconstitution 1580-1837. 
41 Dennison and Ogilvie, ‘Does the European marriage pattern explain growth?’ 
42
 Schofield, ‘English marriage patterns revisited’. We take the bold ‘observed’ figures in Table 2 from the col-
umns headed AM2' and PEM (marriage age and proportion ever married). 
43 Such as the Statute of Labourers 1351. 
44 Clark, ‘The condition of the working class in England’. 
45 Clark, ‘What were the British earnings and prices then?’. He has more data with a wider coverage than Allen 
‘The Great Divegence’.  
46 The Allen ‘Great divergence’ real wage series shows broadly the same pattern, but is focussed on specific 
large towns such as London and Oxford. 
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Figure 2 Comparison of Different Wage Series (Annual) 
 
Figure notes: The Clark wage series is available in Measuring Worth website. The Feinstein-Allen wage series is 
based on Feinstein47 and Allen48. The Clark-HW wage series is computed based on Clark’s male wage49 and fe-
male wage50, weighted by participation rates and working hours of different types of female labour51. Following 
Clark’s wage series, the real earnings are based on 2010 prices. 
Whereas Clark assumes that women’s earnings constituted 25 per cent of men’s in the total of 
earnings throughout six centuries, instead we aggregate his real male wage/earnings with 
Humphies and Weisdorf’s52 two sets of female wages (annual and casual). This requires a 
choice of weights to aggregate the two female series and  to combine the female series with the 
male. We assume all single females53 were on annual contract wages or the equivalent, includ-
ing factory work, and use Wrigley and Schofield’s54 life table level 3 and level 9 to establish 
the age distribution of the population. Married women’s participation rates (i.e. whether or not 
they work for wages at all) are taken from Horrell and Humphries55 for 1781-1795 onwards. 
Before that period we allow a trend increase in participation to allow for the increasing demand 
for spinning until 177056. For those married women that did work we took Arthur Young’s 
(agricultural labour) estimate of 17 weeks work.57 Finally, we use Horrell and Humphries58 
                                                 
47 Feinstein, ‘Pessimism perpetuated’. 
48 Allen, ‘Pessimism preserved’. 
49 Clark, ‘Average earnings and retail prices, UK, 1209-2010’. 
50 Humphries and Weisdorf, ‘The wages of women in England 1260-1850’. 
51 Muldrew, ‘Th’ancient distaff’ and ‘whirling spindle’; Allen, ‘The high wage economy and the industrial revo-
lution’; Horrell and Humphries, ‘Women's labour force participation and the transition to the male breadwinner 
family 1790-1865’. 
52 Humphries and Weisdorf, ‘Wages of women’. 
53 During the high mortality regime (1300-1420), the single female workers are aged 15-20; during the low mor-
tality regime (1421-1870), the single female workers are aged 15-25 due to a higher marriage age. 
54 Wrigley and Schofield, The population history of England. 
55 Horrell and Humphries, ‘Women’s labour force’. 
56 Muldrew, ‘Measuring the contribution of spinning’. 
57
 Rogers, Six centuries, p. 481.   
58 Horrell and Humphries, ‘Old questions, new data’. 
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estimates of the ratio of male earnings to family income to combine male and female 
wages/earnings. These adjustments make surprisingly little difference to the trajectory of the 
Clark male series (Figure 2); the principal effect is to reduce earnings in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries. In other periods movements in component series seem to be offsetting. For 
instance in the century after 1750 female annual contract wages doubled while day wages 
hardly improved at all. Male wages rose by perhaps 50 per cent. 
The cost of living deflator is a vital contributor to the real wage or earnings. For this reason we 
also report Allen’s59 Industrial Revolution real wage index which, largely because of the de-
flator, places the sustained rise in wages later than the Clark series (Figure 2). 
Without other long-run series of factor rewards, implied GDP per capita must track wages. 
With our specification, wide long-run swings in real wages need not change labour’s share in 
GDP, because of factor substitution. Higher wage rates in the fifteenth century, encouraged 
human capital to be substituted for unskilled labour. This implies smarter farming, services and 
manufacturing in the fifteenth century—and less smart in the eighteenth century. But human 
capital was more abundant in the eighteenth century so this effect dominates increased labour 
supply. The other significant substitution possibility is between land and labour. Although the 
total agricultural area is broadly fixed for most of the period, shifts from arable to pastoral 
farming can be interpreted as a substitution of land for labour, as Voth and Voigtlander em-
phasise60. 
Changed factor scarcities may in part have triggered the breakdown of the feudal system itself. 
Feudal landlords and bailiffs would be incentivised to allow serfs to commute customary labour 
services for rent when labour was abundant and wages were low. But the peasant would prefer 
to abandon labour dues when wages were high, the reverse for the landlord. If the system did 
not break, because of landlord power and solidarity, such commutation when wage rates were 
high would not have been permitted. Therefore, viewing the Wars of the Roses as competition 
among landlords would help explain the disintegration of the feudal system. As discussed 
above, Kussmaul suggests that it did not entirely break; ‘service in husbandry’ was the reaction 
of small landowners to labour scarcity. They could control labour effort more effectively if the 
workers were living with their master and mistress. If they lived under the same roof, they 
could not marry and therefore the service regime, in which 15-25 year olds were the largest 
group, raised the age at marriage. 
                                                 
59 Allen, ‘Pessimism preserved: Real wages in the British industrial revolution’. 
60 ‘Fertility restriction’ 
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Labour inputs might vary because of changes in work intensity. However, there is no trend in 
days worked a week by builders since 1250.61 This counts against the view that days worked 
varied substantially over the period and that earnings and GDP per head failed to rise in line 
with fifteenth century wage rates. Hence we do not require an ‘industrious revolution’ (an in-
crease in work intensity) for the Industrial Revolution. Instead the gradual accumulation (and 
diffusion) of human capital by the eighteenth century had raised the demand for labour by 
enhancing its productivity. By contrast an ‘industrious revolution’62 in the eighteenth century, 
increasing work intensity because of the availability of new consumer goods, could have low-
ered wage rates and reduced the demand for human capital. For these reasons and for simplicity, 
we assume a fixed labour input as a proportion of the working age population.63 
III. Measurement of Human Capital 
In our interpretation the European Marriage Pattern (EMP) is linked to human capital acquisi-
tion and accumulation. Following the OECD,64 by human capital we mean ‘the knowledge, 
skills, competencies and attributes embodied in individuals that facilitate the creation of per-
sonal, social and economic well-being’. Hence unlike the demographic data and wages, funda-
mental measurement problems ensure that complete human capital indices are not readily con-
structed. Fully measuring human capital over time is problematic; the concept covers a wider 
range of skills and attributes than literacy, numeracy and schooling. In addition the weighting 
attached to the various components can be expected to change between different epochs. Nor 
is the skill premium any help in the English case. This is first because it is a relative measure, 
not the absolute indicator required, and second because the constancy of the skill ratio after 
1450 suggests social regulation of market forces.65  
Theoretically, individuals’ human capital is measured as the capitalised value of  their expected 
earnings and therefore depends upon the technology of the time and the competition they face, 
as well as their skills. Innovations and their diffusion can redistribute human capital. So the 
nineteenth century handloom weavers found to their costs66 but engine-makers, millwrights 
                                                 
61 Clark, ‘Average earnings and retail prices’. Obviously this does not rule out seasonal variation over the centu-
ries. Clark contends that the Broadberry et al British ecoomic growth conclusion about variation in weekly la-
bour supply depends on their excessively high assumed share of farming in employment before 1700. 
62 De Vries, ‘The industrial revolution and the industrious revolution’. 
63 From the viewpoint of economic development as increased well-being, it should be noted that leisure is a 
component of well-being that is not measured by GDP per capita on which Broadberry et al are focussed. This is 
an important reason for the central place of real wages in the present model. 
64
 OECD, Well-being of nations. 
65 Van Zanden, The long road to the industrial revolution; Phelps Brown and Hopkins, ‘Seven centuries of 
building wages’. 
66 For example from their peak in 1800-6 to the 1830s, nominal wages fell by about two thirds. Wood History of 
wages in the cotton industry, p. 112. 
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and machine-makers, increasingly represented as patentees at the same time, were human cap-
ital beneficiaries67. Consequently total human capital—expected earning power—in the econ-
omy could rise strongly while some workers became worse off. 
Leaving aside measurement for the moment, late age at marriage and the associated pattern of 
service was likely to be a widespread and critical learning experience. In half of the English 
parishes sampled by Kussmaul, servants (employees living in the master’s house) were at least 
half of the hired workforce. Female servants were as liable to be employed as male.68 From the 
age of 15 or earlier, young people were likely to leave their home to live and work in several 
places elsewhere, commonly until marriage around 25 or later. At their new domiciles they 
could learn different ways of management and discipline from their early upbringing. Female 
servants did not merely fulfill purely domestic functions, although some of their duties were of 
a housekeeping nature.69 In the urban north the mercantile and victualling trades appear to have 
created the most employment for female servants and the metal working trade the least. The 
textile, clothing and leather trades were intermediate categories. In rural employment women 
generally ran the dairy, milked the cows, cared for small animals, weeded and performed an-
cillary tasks to agriculture—ale-making and cooking.70 They also might work in non-agricul-
tural subsidiary or principal employments. Joseph Idle (sic), weaver of Murton,Westmoreland, 
in 1787 recorded his ‘family’ as including Betty Robinson, spoolswinder. An essential compo-
nent of the analysis is that service and late marriage age were educative in a general sense.71  
A second element in the interpretation is the transmission of human capital. Informal home 
education by mothers was an important means of accumulating children’s human capital for 
the majority of the population for most of this period (we discuss other channels later). A lit-
erate mother would find it easier to ensure that her child was literate, and the same applies to 
work discipline as to literacy. This type of transmission  has been widely discussed.72 Historical 
evidence of such a process is found in South Carolina before the Civil War73 and in Victorian 
Britain74. In families with more educated mothers the cost or price of achieving a given ‘child 
quality’was lower. So this ‘price’ was a negative function of age at marriage.75 It also depended 
on the likelihood of children surviving (related to the mortality rate) and on the opportunity 
cost of time the wage rate). 
                                                 
67 Macleod, English patent system, p. 149. 
68 Kussmaul, Servants in husbandry in early modern England, p. 57. 
69 Goldberg, ‘Female labour, service and marriage in the late medieval urban north’. 
70 Kussmaul, Servants in husbandry in early modern England, p. 34. 
71 Froide, Never married, p. 89. 
72 DeTray, ‘Child quality and the demand for children’; Marshall, Principles of Economics, p. 469. 
73 Murray, ‘Family literacy and skill training in the Antebellum south’. 
74 Mitch, The rise of popular literacy in Victorian England, ch. 4. 
75
 The price of child quality includes school and apprenticeship fees in principle as well. 
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There is present day evidence for the relationship between female later marriage age and greater 
children’s education.76 Maternal education and maternal age have positive impacts both on 
cognitive skills and behavioural problems.77 Mothers’ age at marriage and education affect 
child quality in India and offspring adult health in the US.78 As this research suggests, what 
was transmitted by the EMP is likely to have been sufficiently general to fall under the descrip-
tion of the ‘culture’ that Clark identifies as largely responsible for international variations in 
1910 cotton mill productivity.79  
A partial measure and proxy for human capital, male and female literacy, was rising gradually 
and steadily long before the standard date for the Industrial Revolution80. Similar results are 
obtained for numeracy by examining age heaping.81 As population more than doubled between 
the 1750s and 1830s the growth of male literacy slowed. Schofield’s marriage register data 
shows total literacy rising from just under 50% to about 58%82. Patent registrations, however, 
show a quite different, exponentially rising, trajectory.83 Between the same two decades they 
increased by a factor of 20.  
The acceleration of patenting reflects a speeding up of industrial advances. Some inventive 
activity was undertaken outside the coverage of patent protection (patenting was expensive); 
Crompton's ‘mule’ is a prominent example. Nonetheless, patents remain an approximate sum-
mary measure of the growth of innovation during the Industrial Revolution from the mid eight-
eenth century.84 
These innovations of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were achieved by individu-
als using only everyday skills, great drive and entrepreneurial abilities.85 The ensuing rise in 
human capital took place despite low growth in literacy and schooling (perhaps following from 
                                                 
76 Georgiadis and Manning, ‘Change and continuity among minority communities in Britain’; Field and Ambus, 
‘Early marriage, age of menarche, and female schooling attainment in Bangladesh’. 
77 Carneiro et al, ‘Maternal education, home environments and the development of children and adolescents’; 
Sutcliffe et al, ‘The health and development of children born to older mothers in the United Kingdom’. 
78 Gaiha and Kulkarni, ‘Anthropometric failure and persistence of poverty in rural India’; Myrskylä and Fe-
nelon, ‘Maternal age and offspring adult health’. 
79 Clark, ‘Why isn't the whole world developed?’. 
80 De Pleijt, ‘Human capital and long run economic growth’. 
81 A’Hearn et al, ‘Quantifying quantitative literacy’; De la Croix and Licandro, ‘The longevity of famous people 
from Hammurabi to Einstein’. 
82 Between the decades from 1754 and from 1830 female literacy rose from 37% to just over 50% while for 
males the rise was from 62% to 66%. 
83 Madsen et al, ‘Four centuries of british economic growth’; Mitchell, Abstract of British historical statistics. 
84 Dutton, The patent system and inventive activity, p. 111; Macleod English patent system p. 8. 
85 Khan, ‘Knowledge, human capital and economic development’. 
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the rapid population growth86). While an apprentice, James Brindley (1716-1772) of Bridge-
water canal fame, taught himself to write but he never mastered it thoroughly.87 The innovator 
of the water frame, Richard Arkwright (1732-92) ‘was scarcely able to write’. ‘When consid-
erably more than fifty years of age, he encroached upon his sleep, in order to gain an hour each 
day to learn English grammar, and another hour to improve his writing and orthography’.88 
The ‘spinning jenny’ inventor, James Hargreaves (d 1778), ‘though illiterate and humble, must 
be regarded as one of the greatest inventors and improvers in the cotton manufacture.’89 George 
Stephenson (1781-1848), whose steam locomotive ‘The Rocket’ began the railway age, was 
illiterate until aged 18 when he was earning enough money to be able to attend night school.90 
Innovators who never, or hardly, attended school as children necessarily acquired their drive 
and skills at least partly through their parents. Brindley’s mother taught him the little she knew 
and encouraged his formation of good habits by her hard work.91 George Stephenson’s parents 
‘set before him an example of sobriety, economy and patient industry.’92 With a more prosper-
ous background James Watt, who radically improved the Newcomen steam engine, was taught 
during his early years entirely at home. There he learned reading, writing and arithmetic from 
his parents, as well as drawing and how to use carpentry tools.93 
Apprenticeship was another means of acquiring and transmitting  human capital in England. 
Wallis points out that the pre-modern apprentice in England was not ‘raw’ labour—they added 
considerable value to their Masters’ business.94 Also since the learning was by watching and 
by doing, the apprentice’s capacity to absorb was influenced by their prior attainment and ori-
entation. Hence the relation of family education to apprenticeship education was sequential and 
complementary, rather than alternative.95  
There was a similar relationship between family education and schooling. Despite attendance 
being voluntary throughout the period of concern here, schools were continually being founded. 
In the York diocese Hoeppner Moran shows that 50 song and reading schools were established 
                                                 
86 De Pleijt and Weisdorf (‘Human capital formation from occupations’) widen the debate with their job classifi-
cation exercise. Their probit model for the chances of being unskilled shows large broadly similar negative ef-
fects of literacy and of being in an industrial parish, suggesting industrialization allowed alternative approaches 
to skill acquisition. This is confirmed by their finding of mobility up the skill ladder over individuals’ lifetimes. 
Possible deskilling is suggested by the positive time trend, accelerating towards the industrial revolution period. 
But we attribute this to the problems created for job classification by increasing structural change. 
87 Smiles, James Brindley and the early engineers, p. 139. 
88 Baines, History of the cotton manufacture in Great Britain, pp. 148, 195. 
89 Baines, History of the cotton manufacture in Great Britain, p. 156. 
90 Smiles, The life of George Stephenson, railway engineer, pp. 16-19. 
91 Smiles, James Brindley and the early engineers, pp. 129-130. 
92 Smiles, The life of George Stephenson, railway engineer, p. 16. 
93 Smiles, Lives of Boulton and Watt, p. 88. 
94 Wallis, ‘Apprenticeship and training in premodern England’. 
95 De la Croix et al, ‘Clans, guilds, and markets’. 
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between 1400 and 1500, and 54 more between 1500 and 1548.96 The dissolution of the mon-
asteries seems to have triggered three unusual decades in which 127 grammar schools were 
created.97 Non-classical schools showed a very different trajectory; foundations rose gradually 
to a peak of 754 in the first three decades of the eighteenth century.98 No doubt these contrib-
uted to the rise of the literacy rate from about five per cent in 150099 to around 50 per cent by 
the 1750s.100  
As an illustration of how aggregate human capital might have changed we construct a geomet-
ric index of literacy and patent stock. To allow that many patents were of no significance we 
apply a discount factor to the patent flow. Towards the middle of the eighteenth century we 
reduce the discount factor to reflect the improvement in the patenting system101 From 1852 
when the costs of patenting were greatly reduced the discount factor is changed again. The 
trajectory of this index is shown in Figure 8. Because the weights in combining the component 
series are inevitably arbitrary102 we contend the human capital series generated by the model 
is more reliable. If the model and the other data are correct then so will be the model-generated 
human capital series.  
IV. Marriage Age and Human Capital 
While earlier data to test the hypothesis of a relation between late age at marriage and female 
human capital is not available, we can find systematic evidence from later in the EMP era. The 
US census for 1910 includes married female immigrants as well as natives and, in effect, their 
age at first marriage. These permit the testing of a link between marriage age and literacy. 
Literacy is a component of human capital and the variation between individuals is unlikely to 
be offset by other aspects of human capital; the innovators discussed above were innovative 
despite their virtual illiteracy not because of it. It is therefore reasonable to infer that literacy 
understates human capital. 
The ability to write can be lost if not used and so the likelihood that many women first learned 
to write before their marriage does not preclude the possibility that maintaining and building 
on this aspect of human capital was facilitated by a later age at marriage. We test this hypothesis 
                                                 
96 Moran, The growth of English schooling. 
97 Boucekkine et al, ‘Early mortality declines at the dawn of modern growth’. 
98 School attendance was not compulsory until 1880 in England. 
99 Cressy, Literacy and the social order, p. 176. 
100 Schofield, ‘Dimensions of illiteracy’. 
101 Macleod, The English patent system, p. 7.  
102 Arbitrary aggregation weights are not always recognised as potentially misleading, as with the UN human 
development index. The ranking of countries by this index can be changed with different weights attributed to 
different national values. 
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while controlling a woman’s being in education,103 her age, property ownership and urban res-
idence. In addition we add controls for region of origin. Since our hypothesis is that the process 
is cumulative and began many centuries before the census date, we expect to find a Western 
European literacy effect stronger than in any other region (except perhaps North America, 
largely populated in the previous century from Western Europe).  
The data are summarised in Table 1. The sample includes migrants originating from every 
region of the world. The majority of the 156,986 observations of married women were born in 
North America (the base case) but 9.4 per cent originated in Central and Eastern Europe and 
about seven per cent came from Northern and Western Europe (including 1.38 per cent from 
England). The average age at marriage was about 22 and almost one half owned property and 
lived in urban area.  
Table 1 Married females in the US 1910 (IPUMS, 1% sample) 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Marriage Age 156,986 21.730 5.304 1 86 
Age 156,986 37.313 12.939 12 100 
In School 156,986 0.019 0.136 0 1 
Urban Resident 156,986 0.460 0.498 0 1 
Own a Property 156,986 0.449 0.497 0 1 
N. America 127,403 81.16%    
C. & S. America 484 0.31%    
N. & W. Europe 10,872 6.93%    
England 2,165 1.38%    
S. Europe 3,101 1.98%    
C. & E. Europe 14,764 9.40%    
E. & S. Asia 195 0.12%    
W. Asia 120 0.08%    
Australasia 18 0.01%    
We run a probit regression with self-assessed ability to write as dependent variable and with 
quadratic age at marriage and age independent variables (Table 2). Consistent with the hypoth-
esis, England’s literacy effect is significantly stronger than for any other region, including 
North America. The probability of a married woman being able to write is around 15.6 per cent 
higher if she originated in Western rather than Eastern Europe and not significantly different 
from North America if England is excluded. The margin over Asia is far greater; about 40 per 
cent.  
                                                 
103 The Census definition is ambiguous but the proportions are so low they cannot refer to ever been in school. 
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Table 2 Marginal Effects of Marriage Age on Literacy 
Pr (literacy)  Coefficients Standard Errors 
Marriage Age (A) 0.0121*** 0.0004 
A2 -0.0002*** 0.0000 
Age -0.0012*** 0.0003 
Age2 -0.0000**  0.0000 
Currently in School 0.0233*** 0.0039 
Urban Resident 0.0701*** 0.0014 
Own a Property 0.0642*** 0.0013 
C. & S. America -0.4729*** 0.0235 
N. & W. Europe -0.0009 0.0032 
(England) 0.0528*** 0.0032 
S. Europe -0.4811*** 0.0093 
C. & E. Europe -0.1562*** 0.0038 
E. & S. Asia -0.3796*** 0.0363 
W. Asia -0.4132*** 0.0471 
Australasia -0.0849 0.0936 
Number of Obs. 156986  
Pseudo R2 0.126  
AIC 83921.37  
BIC 84080.79   
Notes: Base case is North America, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. To test 
the exogeneity of marriage age, we applied “ivprobit” using “no children after 35 years old” as the instrument. 
The null hypothesis that marriage age is exogenous cannot be rejected at 5% level. The N. & W. Europe dummy 
includes England, so the England dummy measures the extra effect of being English. These results are robust to 
inclusion of interaction terms between countries of origin and other control variables. 
The marriage age effect is highly significant statistically. Quantitatively an increase in the mar-
riage age from 18 to 25 is associated with a 3.43 per cent higher chance104 of being able to 
write. Passed on over many generations these small increments cumulatively could have given 
Western Europe the literacy advantage here identified. Less easily measured aspects of human 
capital, such as work discipline, are likely to have been transmitted in the same way to a similar 
extent.  
V. The Structual Model 
We draw inferences about the effects of late marriage from different data, the English time 
series already discussed, by creating a model in which forward looking individuals can belong 
to one of four 15-year cohorts. Childhood (0-15) is the first of these life phases. The marriage 
and child choice is made in the second phase (16-30) while the costs and benefits of these 
                                                 
104 This effect is calculated using total differentiation: ݀ Prሺ݈��݁ݎܽܿݕሻ = ݀ܣ×ሺͲ.Ͳͳʹͳ + ʹ×ሺ−Ͳ.ͲͲͲʹሻ×ܣሻ =͵.Ͷ͵%, where ܣ = ͳͺ and ݀ܣ = ʹͷ − ͳͺ = ͹. 
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choices are incurred in phase three (31-45). Phase four ends with certain death unlike the pre-
vious life stages. 15-year life stages constitute the unit period of the model. Choices and mor-
tality rates are specific to each cohort.  
Figure 3 An Outline of the Demographic-Economic Model of England 
 
Notes: The grey shapes are exogenous variables/shocks determined outside the model, while the others are en-
dogenously determined within the model. The dotted shapes indicate the variables optimally chosen by a rational 
household, and the dashed shapes indicate the variables (partially) determined by a rational producer. The two 
solid circles (wage rate and celibacy rate) are determined by the aggregate forces. The grey arrows indicate the 
causal effects, of which the black ones are the key mechanisms of our model. ܣ: female marriage age, ݊: target 
number of children, ݍ: target quality of children, ݖ: consumption; ܲ: aggregate population, ܪ: aggregate human 
capital, �: aggregate output, ݓ: wage/income; �: celibacy rate determined by ܣ and ݓ. 
The diagram (Figure 3) gives a simplified representation of the model. People have Constant 
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) preferences for the surviving number of children (݊), their 
‘quality’ (ݍ) and consumption goods (ݖ). They choose births to achieve target completed family 
size and hence, in combination with exogenous mortality, population (ܲ). They also choose 
child quality, which eventually influences the aggregate human capital (ܪ) as the children grow 
up. The contribution of child quality to ܪ is the family education, in contrast to the nonfamily 
education, such as schooling, apprenticeship and on-the-job training. Both are captured in the 
human capital formation mechanism in our model. Marriage age (ܣ) and mortality affect the 
cost or price of ‘child quality’ while the cost or price of a surving child only depends on mor-
tality. In this way they influence the number (݊) and ‘quality’ (ݍ) of children. In particular, the 
negative effect of the female marrage age on the price of child quality is the key mechanism 
(the marriage age effect) to be explored in this paper. The proportion remaining unmarried (�) 
 
17 
 
affects the growth of population and varies with the wage rate and the marriage age via a 
search-matching mechanism. 
On the production side of the economy, output (�) is determined by assumed fixed land and 
variable labour (ܲ) and human capital (ܪ). These inputs are combined in a Cobb-Douglas con-
stant returns to scale function together with productivity shocks.105 Wages (ݓ), a constraint on 
household choices, are determined by the marginal productivity of labour. 
Households in this model plan their lives in an uncertain environment; they are subject to a 
variety of unexpected events. Productivity and mortality shocks are distinguished. Runs of poor 
harvests (such as the Great European Famine of 1315-17) and livestock disease constitute a 
negative productivity shock. Epidemic diseases such as bubonic plague, typhus and smallpox 
were mortality shocks. Mortality is autocorrelated and so a shock in one period has repercus-
sions in the next. This implies that periods of high mortality such as occurred in the severn-
teenth century (and their ending) in principle might be attributed to random events, despite 
their persistence.106 Shocks can explain but are not explained. A structural break is assumed 
for the shock structures and the average celibacy rate around 1420, but household preferences 
and technologies are kept constant across mortality regimes. 
The primary source of demographic data is Wrigley and Schofield’s crude mortality and fertil-
ity rates derived from 404 Anglican parish registers of baptism, marriage and burial.107 Steady 
states of mortality rates are set to match the historical life expectancy pattern over the entire 
period. A life expectancy at birth of 23 (as Hatcher108 calculates for the Canterbury Benedictine 
priory) is assumed for the ‘high mortality’ regime from about 1300 to 1420 (level 3), and a life 
expectancy of 38 (level 9) for the subsequent ‘low mortality’ regime of the remainder of the 
sample period.109 
Most of the model parameters are estimated to minimise the squared distance between the sim-
ulated and the observed mean values and standard deviations of data series, using the simulated 
method of moments. The calibrated exceptions are ‘average stopping births age’ (35 years 
old)110 and ‘gaps between births’ (2.5 years).111  
                                                 
105 The impact of physical capital is not separately distinguished. The human capital concept in our model re-
flects the accompanying accumulation of physical capital because physical capital must be paired with human 
capital to be effective. Also in production activities investment in physical capital was not a significant propor-
tion of output until the coming of the railways. Feinstein and  Pollard Capital formation in the United Kingdom. 
106 We have in mind De la Croix and Licandro’s finding, as well as Geoffrey Parker’s account.  
107 Wrigley and Schofield, The population history of England. 
108 Hatcher, ‘Mortality in the fifteenth century’. 
109 Wrigley and Schofield, The population history of England, level 3, p. 714. 
110 Flinn, The European demographic system 1500-1820, p. 335.  
111 This assumed constancy is a simplification because birth spacing typically increases with births. 
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The estimated elasticity of substitution (0.152) implies very little possibility of switching be-
tween numbers of children, and child quality, in the preferences. This is an important difference 
between the present exercise and the post-Malthusian regime of Galor and Weil’s unified 
growth.112 There, technological developments raise the rate of return to human capital and stim-
ulate a substitution of child quality for child quantity. But with the low value estimated here, 
substitution is unlikely to have mattered historically as much as the continuous gradual accu-
mulation of human capital.113 
The contribution of education by the family (0.6) is estimated to be greater than education 
outside the family in the wider society (0.4). But the family education contribution includes 
payment of school and apprenticeship fees and other educational demands on the household 
budget. The elasticity of marriage age is found to be -1.288; if marriage age rises by one per 
cent relative to age 16, the price of child quality decreases by 1.288 per cent. For example, 
when the modelled marriage age rises, as it does, from 18 in the high mortality regime to 24 in 
the low mortality regime (by 33 per cent), child quality is about 42.5 per cent cheaper, ceteris 
paribus.114 Consistent with the specification, the celibacy rate increases when marriage age is 
higher than expected and falls when wages are higher than anticipated. 
Using the estimated or calibrated values of the parameters, we can replicate the sample means 
or theoretical steady states and the standard deviations of  the real wage, births, deaths and 
population115. With these parameters the ‘preventative check’ to population (higher marriage 
age, lower births) of Malthusian theory and the inverse of the ‘positive check’ (lower deaths, 
higher growth of population), are apparentbetween the two mortality regimes in Table 3. Prem-
ature deaths probabilistically affect the costs of raising a surviving child. Consequently, after 
the end of the high mortality regime both target family size (and therefore population) and child 
quality increase. The price of child quality falls further than the price of child quantity because 
of the additional marriage age effect shown in Figure 3.  
The fall in the price of child quality increases human capital which raises the productivity of 
labour, offsetting diminishing returns to a rising population. When wages increase, so does 
target child number, child quality, and consumption. Greater affluence tends to lowers marriage 
                                                 
112 Galor and Weil, ‘Population, technology, and growth’. 
113 A low elasticity indicates gross complementarity. If the price of quality rises, expenditure on quality also rises 
and switches from the number of children, so that fewer are likely to be demanded. 
114 This qualification is important because the overall drop in  the price of quality is 60%, which also includes 
the effect of lower mortality rates. 
115
 The simulated periods (580 years, 38 periods) are longer than the sample periods of birth rates and death rates 
(330 years, 22 periods) but the same as population and wage. The model closely matches the second moments of 
of the observed data, but there are discrepancies between the simulated steady states and sample means (the ‘first 
moments’). This is because the simulated steady states are not equivalent to sample means. The sample means 
measure the average levels of the variables in real history, which is never in a steady state because of continual 
shocks. In contrast, the steady states are defined as the long-run levels when the effects of shocks die away. 
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age. Pushing in the other direction, higher wages also raise child ‘price’, or opportunity cost, 
reducing projected family size. But the biggest impact comes from the fall in mortality between 
the two regimes that requires fewer births  to achieve a given target family size. The mortality 
effect strongly raises the marriage age. Because this last outcome dominates the determination 
of marriage age, the end of the high mortality regime raises the age, as noted above.  
Table 3 Simulated and Observed Means and Standard Deviations 
Variables Regime Simulated  Steady State 
Sample  
Mean 
Simulated  
Std. Dev. 
Sample  
Std. Dev. 
Marriage Age HMR 18.02 [18~21] 3.04  
 LMR 24.11 [24~26] 0.34  
Population Growth HMR 0.000 -0.085 0.141 0.151 
 LMR 0.069 0.082 0.079 0.079 
Birth Rate HMR 1.281  0.778  
 LMR 0.612 0.627 0.104 0.104 
Death Rate HMR 0.562  0.150  
 LMR 0.337 0.313 0.039 0.039 
Celibacy Rate HMR 0.155  0.026  
 LMR 0.147 [0.128] 0.031  
Wage Growth HMR 0.080 0.090 0.110 0.103 
 LMR 0.014 0.015 0.079 0.079 
Price of HMR 0.141  0.080  
Child Number LMR 0.080  0.011  
Price of HMR 0.113  0.080  
Child ‘Quality’ LMR 0.044  0.006  
Notes: Fragmentary data based on small sample in square parentheses. HMR: high mortality regime (1300-1420). 
LMR: low mortality regime (1421-1870). 
VI. Simulation 
To show how well the model with the estimated parameters ‘retrodicts’, we simulate the six 
centuries’ demographic and economic history. We go on to show the importance of marriage 
age effect by a simulation without this effect. Finally we consider what might have happened 
in England had some of the characteristics of other economies been shared.  
In Figure 4-Figure 7 the grey broken lines are the simulated series (the conditional expected 
values based on individuals’ current information) and the black solid lines are the actual series. 
Most of the fluctuations in the data can be well matched. One novelty of the simulation method 
we adopt here is that we can make full use of the unbalanced data; the real wage series116 has 
                                                 
116 Clark, ‘What were the British earnings and prices then?’. 
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more observations than the mortality and birth rate series117 and than the celibacy and marriage 
ages.118 The broken lines unaccompanied by solid lines (Figure 8 and Figure 9) show the se-
ries generated by the model, but the data counterparts are unavailable (or there is only frag-
mentary evidence).  
Both observed and simulated population growth turn upwards after the first quarter of the eig-
teenth century (Figure 4), whereas real wage growth begins permanently much later (Figure 
5). An essential point is that the model, driven by the long and gradual accumulation of human 
capital, captures the eventual upsurge in real wages of the Industrial Revolution. Interestingly 
the (model-consistent) turning point is later (the 15-year period 1826-40) than indicated by the 
modified Clark series (1810-25) and corresponds more closely with the Allen’s real wages119 
(though is still below it). If the model is correct then real wages do begin rising later than 
indicated by the modified Clark series (though they were used in the model).  
The intensity and frequency of mortality crises (shocks) diminish with the success of Western 
European quarantine regulations from the early eighteenth century120 (Figure 7). The demo-
graphic consequences, more surviving children, are realised more rapidly than the effects op-
erating through human capital accumulation. This is because greater child quality must take 
longer to be translated into higher wages than the stronger demand for children’s numbers takes 
to trigger an increase in population (Figure 4). Female age at marriage jumps from around 18 
to 24 in the mid-fifteenth century (Figure 8), by which time the high mortality regime is as-
sumed over121. 
The model’s four 15-year life phases imposes the restriction that everyone must die by the age 
of 60, which upwardly biases the death rate. Hence the simulated death rate of Figure 7 is 
higher than the observed. The marriage age pattern does not correspond closely with the sim-
ulated series (Figure 8). One reason may be that the ‘observed’ data are a small sample, the 
mean of which is subject to greater variation than would be the ideal series, derived from a 
much larger number of parishes. On the other hand, the drop in the celibacy rate between the 
seventeenth and eigteenth centuries is broadly captured by the simulation (Figure 9). The sim-
ulated human capital series accelerates broadly similarly to the constructed series although 
these ‘data’ were not used in the model estimation. A simple visual test suggests that all the 
longer simulated series fit the data quite well. 
                                                 
117 Wrigley and Schofield, The population history of England. 
118 Schofield, ‘English marriage patterns revisited’. 
119 Allen, ‘Pessimism preserved: Real wages in the British industrial revolution’. 
120 Chesnais, The demographic transition, p. 141. 
121 Data used in the model for female age at first marriage are from Wrigley et al (‘English population history 
from family reconstitution 1580-1837’), which show a fall in marriage age from the 1730s. These data are col-
lected from only 26 parishes that may not be representative of the entire country, however (Ruggles, ‘The limita-
tions of english family reconstitution’). 
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Figure 4 Simulated and Observed Population 
 
Figure 5 Simulated and Observed Real Wage 
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Figure 6 Simulated and Observed Birth Rate 
 
Figure 7 Simulated and Observed Death Rate 
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Figure 8 Simulated and Observed Marriage Age and Human Capital 
 
Figure 9 Simulated and Observed Celibacy Rate 
 
The importance of the marriage age for human capital in this model can be demonstrated by an 
exercise that excludes the effect on the price of child quality. This is achieved by assuming 
there is no inter-generational transmission of human capital through the family. A lower age of 
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maternity implies the possibility of more children but also imposes a higher ‘price of quality’—
which we can interpret as stemming from the lower accumulation of personal savings and 
household goods, as well as being an effect of maternal human capital. The simulation reported 
by the dashed line in Figure 5 shows the consequences for wages; there is no eventual upturn 
and wages are about half the level actually achieved. 
To consider what English growth experience might have been under different circumstances, 
and to compare with other economies, we replace hypothesized key features of other economies 
with those of England. A caveat is due here—the simulations are NOT intended to match ex-
actly other countries growth of real wages. Rather, the purpose is to show how the English 
economy might have deviated from the actual historical path if some parameters or the shock 
path were different. That is why the ‘countries’ are in quotation marks; only single possible 
characteristics of these countries are reflected in the simulations. To allow for delayed take-off 
timing in these simulations, we extend the simulation horizon another 10 periods (150 years).  
Figure 10 Simulated Wage of Other ‘Countries’ 
 
In this way we can show that real wages in England are predicted by the model to go on rising 
after 1870 (when the data used ends). In Figure 10 the black solid line is the observed (modi-
fied Clark’s) wage series, and the dashed line is the extended forecast122. 
                                                 
122
  The mortality shocks are randomly sampled from the actual shocks during the entire Low Mortality Regime. 
The productivity shocks are sampled from the actual shocks during the last 6 periods (1780-1870). The latter is to 
reflect that there might be a structural break in productivity shock structure. 
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To capture a non-European environment with a low marriage age (Hajnal, 1965, especially 
Table 4 and discussion) and low real wages that we term ‘Asia’, we broadly follow Jones123 in 
the model adjustments. We keep the high mortality regime throughout the exercise and increase 
the utility weight of the number of children by 40% to capture a possible cultural difference124. 
Figure 10 shows that under these conditions the simulated model of the English economy 
yields a real wage that is very low and barely rises at all until the last decade of the twentieth 
century. Also female marriage age remains below 20 and population oscillates wildly.  
In the first half of the seventeenth century the Netherlands was probably the most productive 
economy in the world. Then the country experienced a series of strong negative productivity 
surprises from 1650 to around 1820. Dutch supremacy on the high seas and in international 
markets was undermined by Cromwell’s Navigation Acts of the 1650s and Colbert’s protec-
tionist policies in the following two decades. Dutch trade, shipping and  real wages suffered  
(van Zanden and van Leuween, 2012). To imitate the impact we replace England’s actual 
shocks in the model during that period  with  only England’s negative shocks. The results shows 
that, had the English economy been subject to a sequence of savage blows in the seventeenth 
century like the Netherlands’, real wages would have fallen as they did in the Netherlands. The 
importance of the nature and timing of shocks, or surprises, that this experiment demonstrates,  
offers a development of Crafts’ contention that Britain industrialised before France only by 
chance125. 
Germany’s economy may have been more constrained by guild power than England’s126; if so 
the production function would have been less efficient. This could explain the lag behind Eng-
land in the sustained rise of real wages, despite the European Marriage Pattern. To test for this 
possibility  the output elasticity of human capital, is adjusted down by 10% to mimic a ‘Ger-
man’ type of stronger guild institutions (on the supply side). The simulation confirms the sen-
sitivity of real wage growth to this type of restriction by showing no increase in England’s real 
wages until after 1870. 
VII. Conclusion 
The complexities of the interaction between demography and economy for several centuries of 
English history inevitably require simplification if the main elements of the process are to be 
understood. Our model is a judgment based upon current evidence as to what mattered most 
for the economic development that culminated in the first Industrial Revolution. Linking de-
mography and economics focuses attention on the great length of time over which the effects 
                                                 
123 Jones, ‘The European miracle’. 
124 The mortality shocks are selected from the actual shocks during the High Mortality Regime, but the produc-
tivity shocks after 1945 are sampled from the period 1780-1870. 
125 Crafts, ‘Why was England first?’ 
126 Ogilvie, ‘Guilds, efficiency and social capital’. 
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of shocks to the inter-generational accumulation of human capital may be felt, stemming from 
the longevity of human capital, thanks to the potential length of human life.  
The model127 shows how the European Marriage Pattern emerged with the ending of the high 
mortality of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. In the higher mortality regime there is a 
falling population and a tendency for real wages to rise, because of diminishing returns with a 
fixed land area. The eventual fall in mortality meant that fewer births were necessary for a 
given completed family size. A rise in the female age at first marriage was the response, though 
there is considerably more to be said about the contribution of institutional change with the 
decline of feudalism. Because the Humphries and Weisdorf128 series show no rise for female 
contract labour wages in the fifteenth century, both the de Moor and van Zanden hypothesis of 
the EMP originating from higher female wages, and Voth and Voigtlander’s focus on the shift 
from arable to more female-intensive pastoral farming, seem less satisfactory explanations129. 
In  the rest of the period, a constant steady state mortality (albeit subject to shocks) is assumed 
—the ‘lower mortality regime’, which divides into two phases. The earlier is a Malthusian 
epoch of falling or stagnant real wages and rising population. The later phase is the Industrial 
Revolution epoch when real wages rise sustainably along with population.  
Because of this lower mortality, there was strong population growth during the English Indus-
trial Revolution period, compared with non-EMP areas. This was a constraint upon the rise in 
real wages. Yet the EMP, one of Malthus’ preventative checks, might have been expected to 
hold down population expansion compared with other regions without this institution130. The 
explanation developed in this paper is that the EMP in England also had another, more im-
portant, effect—to increase the growth of human capital (which is consistent with De Moor 
and Van Zanden131, though a more limited proces than their female empowerment or auton-
omy). Human capital accumulation eventually improved productivity fast enough to overcome 
the consequences of the population growth.  
De Pleijt and Van Zanden recently have confirmed the importance of broad human capital in 
long term European development132, in effect revising earlier work by Allen133. But the later 
Allen provides an account entirely consistent with the model estimated here.134 Greater skill 
                                                 
127 In a four overlapping generations structure. Model available in web appendix. 
128 Humphries and Weisdorf ‘Wages of women’ Figure 3. 
129 De Moor and Van Zanden ‘Girl power’ p3 ‘relatively high remuneration’; Voigtländer and Voth, ‘Fertility 
restriction’. 
130 Voigtländer and Voth, ‘Fertility restriction’. 
131 De Moor and Van Zanden ‘Girl power’. 
132 De Pleijt and Van Zanden ‘Accounting for the little divergence’. 
133 Allen ‘Progress and poverty’. 
134 Allen, The British industrial revolution in global perspective. 
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and discipline warranted higher wages. These high wages incentivised the search for innova-
tions that would reduce labour costs. Innovation was a trial and error process undertaken by 
determined and enquiring persons usually lacking formal training but with the work discipline 
acquired at an early stage in life. 
Further research could extend the model to allow for changes in labour intensity to address the 
divergences between wage rates and the Broadberry et al GDP per capita series. Explaining 
mortality changes, another extension, is likely to trigger a more extended rise in the marriage 
age. Distinguishing, rather than aggregating, male and female wages in a later, inevitably much 
more complex, version of the model may also illuminate movements in marriage ages and 
celibacy rates.  
Other West European economies showed a similar marriage pattern to England, yet did not 
simultaneously experience a similar economic growth pattern. One reason might be that human 
capital accumulation induced by the marriage pattern simply began later (as in Southern Eu-
rope135). Anyway, it is likely that the model parameters of these economies or even their struc-
tures differed from England’s. We have given some examples of the consequences of such 
differences in our simulations. 
In conclusion, our claim is not that the marriage pattern was a sufficient condition for the Eng-
lish Industrial Revolution at the beginning of the nineteenth century, or for Industrial Revolu-
tions elsewhere. Rather the marriage pattern was a major contributor, along with many other 
conditions, to the eventual upsurge in real wages that we consider the defining characteristic 
of the English Industrial Revolution.  
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APPENDIX: THE FULL MODEL 
The Household. The representative combined male and female agent of the generation born 
in period � − ͳ maximizes her CES utility (�) in period � (the young adulthood): 
    11 11
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(i) The target number of children ݊ is divided by 2, because the utility of ݊ children is shared 
by the two parents. (ii) The target quality of children ݍ is defined as the ratio of children’s to 
parents’ human capital levels. (iii) Consumption flow ݖ� enters the utility as a relative ratio 
rather than an absolute level. This ‘habit persistence’, as described in the macroeconomic lit-
erature, in material consumption has a justification from psychology; changes in consumption, 
not the level, affect utility136. There are four constraints in this maximization problem: 
(H1) Budget Constraint: 
2 2
, 1 , 1
0 0
1 1
2 2t i n t t q t t t t ii i
w n q n z         ; 
(H2) Marriage Age Equation:  1 2 0 1, 1 , 2 ; ,t t t tA A n m m a a  ;  
(H3) Price of Children Quality Equation:  
, 1 1 0 1, , 1 , 2 ; , ,q t q t t t tw A m m b b    ; 
(H4) Price of Children Quantity Equation:  
, 1 0, 1 , 2 ;n t n t t tw m m c   . 
Constraint (H1) specifies that lifetime earnings (ݓ) are equal to the lifetime expenditures (by 
‘earnings’ we also mean earnings in kind from domestic production consumed in the house-
hold). Expenditure on children is shared by both husband and wife, so is halved for the repre-
sentative agent137. 
Constraint (H2) imposes a restriction on female’s marriage age ܣ�, which negatively depends 
on the total planned births, taking premature deaths in childhood and young adulthood (݉ͳ, ݉ʹ) into consideration138. ܽ଴ is the age women usually stop planning for, or expecting, new 
children (assumed around 35), and ܽଵ is the average gap between births (2.5 years). 
Constraint (H3) states that the relative generalised price of educating each surviving child (ߨ�) 
depends positively on mortality rates (݉), and negatively on mother’s marriage age ܣ, (which 
                                                 
136 Because the other two utility inputs (݊ and ݍ) are stationary, the third utility input must be also. 
137 Agents make their choices in the expectation (or hope) of living for the full four periods of the model, even 
though they may be wrong. Remarriage was a common means of maintaining the household in the event of the 
premature death of a spouse. 
138 Family targeting plans are assumed to be based on survival of children to (approximately) age 30, perhaps to 
support parents in old age. 
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is an indicator of the level of the mother’s human capital). The parameter ܾ଴ can be interpreted 
as the average proportion of income spent on ݍ, while ܾଵ is the lower bound of marriage age. � ≡ −݀ ln ߨ� /݀ ln ܣ measures the elasticity of human capital accumulation with respect to 
marriage age. The coefficient on wages is expected to be positive reflecting the opportunity 
cost of parental time. The same applies with H4. The price of child quality includes school and 
apprenticeship fees (or the availability of apprenticeships) in principle as well. 
Constraint (H4) indicates that the relative generalised price of feeding and clothing each sur-
viving child (ߨ�) increases with mortality rates, where ܿ଴ is the average proportion of income 
spent on ݊.  
The law of motion for population ( �ܲ: population stock at time �) is: 
1t t t tP P D B   . 
Total deaths (��: death flow in period �) are the sum of premature and natural deaths: 
1 1 11 2 1 3 2 1 3t t t t t t t tD m B m G m G G          . 
Here, ܩ��−ଵ denotes the population of the generation born in period � − � still living at time � − ͳ (at the beginning of period�):       1 12 1 2
1 1 1
2 1 1 1 2
3 1 1 1 2 1 3
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Total births in period � (ܤ�: birth flow in period �) can be defined as:     1 1 11 22 1 1 1 2t t tt t tG nB m m      . 
The variable �� captures the proportion of females without any children. It includes both never-
married females and married females with no offspring. The unmatched proportion is a func-
tion of search and matching costs which are positively correlated with marriage age (�ଵ > Ͳ) 
and negatively with wage (�ଶ < Ͳ). The term �̅ is the average celibacy rate, while ܣ�∗ and ݓ�∗ 
are the expected level of marriage age and wage in absence of all shocks. 
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         . 
Based on ܤ�and ��, we can define birth rate (ܾ�) and death rate (݀�) to link with the observable 
historical data. In particular, the birth rate is the birth flow during period � divided by the pop-
ulation stock at the beginning of period � (or at time � − ͳ). The death rate is the death flow 
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during period � divided by the sum of the population at � − ͳ and the birth flow during period �, because the death rate takes into account the premature deaths of those in their childhood 
period. 
1
t
t
t
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P ; 1 tt t tDd P B  . 
Lastly, the labour force of period � is the population stock ( �ܲ−ଵ) excluding the generations in 
their childhood during period �. 
Production. Where � is output, ܪ is human capital per capita, ̅ܨ is a fixed production factor, 
especially land,Π is profit and ݔ� a random productivity shock, the representative production 
unit’s (farm’s) problem is: 
1max fixed costst t t tY w P    , subject to:  
(F1) Production Function:  
1 2 1 21
1 1
tx
t t tY e P H F
      ; 
(F2) Aggregate Human Capital: 
1 2
1 2 3t t t
t t t t
t t t
G G GH Q Q Q
P P P    ; 
(F3) Generational Human Capital:  11 2 1txt t t tQ e H Q q     . 
Constraint (F1) describes the production technology with three separate inputs. ܪ�−ଵ is the hu-
man capital per capita influencing period �, by which the ‘raw’labour force ( �ܲ−ଵ) is augmented. 
The two variables are lagged because the contemporaneous values would include children. ̅ܨ 
represents the factors that cannot be reproduced such as land.For simplicity, it is set equal to 1 
without loss of generality and is equivalent to normalising output by land. 
Constraint (F2) defines the aggregate human capital (ܪ�), which is a weighted average of the 
generational human capital in the labour force (the three working ‘generations’). 
Constraint (F3) describes how each generation’s human capital level (ܳ�) is formed.  
Finally, to complete the system of equilibrium conditions, a competitive labour market is pos-
tulated, so that the marginal product of labour equals the marginal cost: 
1
1 1
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t t t
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     . 
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We assume the exogenous productivity process is AR(1): ݔ� = ߩ� ∙ ݔ�−ଵ + ݁ݔ�, where ݁ݔ� is 
white noise with standard deviation equal to ��.Similarly, there are three exogenous condi-
tional premature mortality rates:   1 11 1 exp 1 , where 1 1 1t t t t tm m mm mm mm emm      ;   2 12 2 exp 2 , where 2 2 2t t t t tm m mm mm mm emm      ;   3 13 3 exp 3 , where 3 3 3t t t t tm m mm mm mm emm      . 
Here, ݉�̅̅̅̅ ’s (� = ͳ,ʹ,͵) are the steady state mortality rates and ݁݉݉��’s are white noises with 
standard deviations equal to ��. mm1 is the death rate of generation 1 (those aged up to 15). 
We set the steady states of mortality rates to match the historical life expectancy pattern over 
the six centuries139. 
 Meaning Estimates ߩଵ AR coefficient of shock mm1 0.522 0.200 ߩଶ AR coefficient of shock mm2 0.063 -0.431 ߩଷ AR coefficient of shock mm3 0.900 0.021 ߩ� AR coefficient of shock x 0.825 0.406 �ଵ Standard deviation of shock emm1 0.487 0.275 �ଶ Standard deviation of shock emm2 0.011 0.414 �ଷ Standard deviation of shock emm3 0.011 0.627 �� Standard deviation of shock ex 0.010 0.050 
 
 
                                                 
139 The calibrated rates should not be interpreted as a strict mapping from the life tables in Wrigley and 
Schofield (1989, p. 714) or any other sources. Since the model only has four generations with a maximum life of 
60 years, the mortality rates in each cohort are inevitably different from the life table which has a maximum life 
of 90 years. 
